Superconditioning refers to supernormal responding to a conditioned stimulus (CS) that sometimes occurs in classical conditioning when the CS is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) in the presence of a conditioned inhibitor for that US. In the present research, we conducted 4 experiments to investigate causal superlearning, a phenomenon in human causal learning analogous to superconditioning. Experiment 1 demonstrated superlearning relative to appropriate control conditions. Experiment 2 showed that superlearning wanes when the number of cues used in an experiment is relatively large. Experiment 3 determined that even when relatively many cues are used, superlearning can be observed provided testing is conducted immediately after training, which is problematic for explanations by most contemporary learning theories. Experiment 4 found that ratings of a superlearning cue are weaker than those to the training excitor which gives basis to the conditioned inhibitor-like causal preventor used during causal superlearning training. This is inconsistent with the prediction by propositional reasoning accounts of causal cue competition, but is readily explained by associative learning models. In sum, the current experiments revealed some weaknesses of both the associative and propositional reasoning models with respect to causal superlearning.
In classical conditioning, when compounds of multiple conditioned stimuli (CSs) are paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US), resultant conditioned responding to each CS is determined not only by the relationship of the target CS with the US, but also by that between the other (companion) CSs and the US. Such interactions of associative learning among multiple CSs in classical conditioning usually take the form of reduced responding relative to when the target CS is conditioned elementally. Consequently these interactions are commonly referred to as "cue competition." Several different forms of cue competition have been reported in conventional Pavlovian preparations (e.g., overshadowing, blocking, and relative stimulus validity), and analogous forms of them have been observed in human associative learning situations such as contingency judgment and causal learning. For example, blocking is frequently observed both in classical conditioning with nonhuman animals (e.g., Kamin, 1968 Kamin, , 1969 and in human associative learning (e.g., Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Shanks, 1985) , which consequently stimulated a debate concerning whether or not these two learning phenomena share a common underlying mechanism.
In most cases of cue interaction, responding to a target CS is weaker than when it is conditioned in the absence of a companion CS; that is, associative learning between a companion cue and a US interferes with learning or at least expression of the resultant CS-US association. However, there exists one exception called superconditioning (another is potentiation; e.g., Clarke, Westbrook, & Irwin, 1979) . Superconditioning is defined as an enhancement of the conditioned response (CR) resulting from pairing a target CS with a US in compound with a previously established conditioned inhibitor for the US. This effect was first predicted by the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model, and is also expected by several other learning theories (e.g., Stout & Miller, 2007; Wagner, 1981) . The hallmark feature of superconditioning is that the magnitude of the CR to the superconditioned CS exceeds the magnitude of the CR observed when the target CS is compounded with an associatively neutral companion cue (i.e., one that is not a conditioned inhibitor). Thus, superconditioning is conceptually the mirror image of blocking, with the companion CS being a conditioned inhibitor rather than a conditioned excitor as in blocking, and the resultant change in stimulus control being an increase rather than a decrease in responding to the target CS. Because of this symmetry with blocking, superconditioning is an important touchstone for learning models in explaining cue interaction in general. There are numerous accounts of the various cue competition phenomena, but most of them have difficulty in explaining an enhancement of responding that results from interactions among cues trained in compound. For example, some models (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Miller & Matzel, 1988) are unable to account for superconditioning because they regard cue competition as the result of distraction from the target CS during training or interference with retrieval by the target CS at test. Other models (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Rescorla, 1968) predict and explain various phenomena in associative learning using conditional probabilities of occurrence of the outcome in the presence and absence of the CS. Without additional assumptions, these theories generally are unable to account for responding to a CS reinforced in the presence of an inhibitor that is greater than to a CS consistently paired with the same US in the absence of an inhibitory companion cue.
Although some early studies (e.g., Blanchard & Honig, 1976; Rescorla, 1971; Taukulis & Revusky, 1975) claimed to have demonstrated superconditioning, it is hard to conclude from these studies that genuine superconditioning had occurred because of their lack of appropriate control conditions. Unequivocal evidence of superconditioning should be based on comparisons with two different control conditions: an overshadowing/potentiation control and an elemental acquisition control. (a) An overshadowing/ potentiation control condition consists of the target CS being paired with the US in compound with an associatively neutral cue. (b) An elemental acquisition control consists of the target CS being paired with the US without any other nominal stimulus being present. Lack of either control condition allows the possibility that the greater behavioral control observed in the experimental condition resulted from phenomena other than superconditioning, such as potentiation (Clarke et al., 1979) or at least a reduction in overshadowing (e.g., Navarro, Hallam, Matzel, & Miller, 1989) . Especially important is a comparison with the elemental acquisition control because pairing a CS with a US in compound with another CS (i.e., the manipulation in the overshadowing/potentiation condition) often results in overshadowing (Pavlov, 1927) . Thus, a control condition is needed to assure that responding to the target CS has not been reduced by overshadowing (i.e., an elemental acquisition control condition) in an overshadowing/potentiation control condition. Conversely, omission of an overshadowing/potentiation control would fail to differentiate between the enhanced responding of the experimental condition arising from the companion cue being inhibitory (i.e., superconditioning) or from potentiation by the companion cue that does not depend on its being inhibitory. Some more recent studies (e.g., Pearce & Redhead, 1995; Rescorla, 2004; Urushihara, Wheeler, Pineño, & Miller, 2005; Williams & McDevitt, 2002) have provided evidence for genuine superconditioning with appropriate control conditions in Pavlovian conditioning preparations with nonhuman subjects.
Compared with these demonstrations of superconditioning in classical conditioning situations with nonhumans, there is far less evidence of the corresponding phenomenon in human causal learning situations, so-called "superlearning." As far as we are aware, Aitken, Larkin, and Dickinson (2000) reported a superlearning effect set in a causal scenario, and later Turner, Aitken, Shanks, Sahakian, Robbins, Schwarzbauer, and Fletcher (2004) published a superlearning experiment similar to those of Aitken et al. to explore the role of prediction error with functional MRI (fMRI). In Aitken et al.'s experiments, a cue (i.e., the target cause) was paired with an outcome (i.e., an effect) in compound with a previously established preventative cue (i.e., a causal analogue to a conditioned inhibitor) in a superlearning condition. Causal ratings of the superlearning cue were compared with those of either a cue paired with the outcome in compound with a novel companion cue (in Experiments 1 and 2) or in compound with a cue that had previously been presented without the outcome the same number of times as the preventative cue as a control for any effects of stimulus pre-exposure (in Experiment 3). They observed that the causal rating of the superlearning cue was higher to those in control conditions. The design adopted by Turner et al. was based on a comparison similar to Aitken et al.'s Experiment 3 and produced the same tendency. An apparent problem with these studies is that they did not include an elemental acquisition control condition. Thus, they left open the possibility that higher rating of the superlearning cue was observed simply because a preventative cue might be less effective in decreasing the rating of the target cue (i.e., less effective as an overshadowing agent) than a novel cue or a cue presented the same number of times but not previously trained as a preventive cue.
Our intent was to seek unequivocal evidence of causal superlearning, that is, to determine whether people judge a potential cause to be a supernormal cause of an effect as a result of its being trained in compound with a preventive cause, and assuming that the effect was obtained, to illuminate why this effect occurs. For these purposes, we conducted four experiments in an allergy task, a standard causal learning task used in many prior experiments including Aitken et al. (2000) and Turner et al. (2004) .
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to seek evidence of superlearning with two essential control conditions in a human causal learning situation. As our initial attempts to replicate Aitken et al. (2000) with the elemental acquisition control condition did not provide unequivocal results, the present design (see Table 1 ) differed considerably from that of Aitken et al.
The experiment consisted of two blocks, each consisting of three phases of training followed by a test. The critical difference between the two blocks was that Cue X was reinforced in the presence of a preventive cue in the superlearning block and in the presence of a novel cue in the overshadowing/potentiation (hereafter referred to as "overshadowing") block.
The design of Experiment 1 included the following three major modifications of Aitken et al.'s (2000) design. Aitken et al. used a binary outcome; that is, the effect (i.e., an allergic reaction) in their allergy task either occurred or did not occur. In the present experiments, we presented allergic reactions of three different intensities in addition to the absence of allergic reactions. The weakest outcome was used in the superlearning and overshadowing conditions as well as the elemental acquisition control conditions so that we can avoid a ceiling effect in the elemental control: demonstrating superlearning in comparison with the elemental control is usually difficult if ratings of an elemental acquisition cue already approach a ceiling for responding. The use of weak outcome in these conditions allowed us to avoid this problem by keeping ratings in the elemental acquisition control moderately low. The strongest outcome was used in preventative cue training so that robust strong preventative learning would occur to that cue, which is predicted to enhance superlearning by several models of associative learning (e.g., Denniston, Savastano, & Miller, 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Stout & Miller, 2007; Wagner, 1981) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Note our working assumption here that allergic reactions of different intensities are viewed on a continuum rather than as unique outcomes.
The second change from the design of Aitken et al. (2000) was to introduce preventive training of each conditioned preventer with multiple training excitors (Cues A and M) and continue it during the superlearning training (Phase 2). The use of multiple training excitors was intended to encourage participants to process compound cues that included the conditioned preventer in an elemental rather than configural manner, and the continuation of preventive training during the superlearning phase was to protect the conditioned preventer from losing its preventive power during superlearning training. The predictions of superlearning by most associative theories are premised on elemental processing of the target cause and conditioned preventer when they are presented in compound, and some of them predict a loss of preventive power by the conditioned preventer in the course of superlearning trials that would lead to weaker superlearning.
The third change from Aitken et al.'s (2000) procedure was to decrease the number of stimuli that each participant had to process in a given block of treatments by dividing the experiment into two different subexperiments (i.e., blocks). Superlearning experiments, especially when implemented in a within-subject design, tend to require a relatively large number of cues: at least three different target cues (superlearning target, overshadowing target, and elemental target), a preventive cue, its training excitor, and an overshadowing cue, plus several filler cues. Vandorpe and De Houwer (2006) found that some types of cue interaction phenomena became more difficult to obtain as the number of cues in the experiment increases. Seemingly, more mental resources are necessary for participants to process a greater number of cues at one time, which leads to a decrement in resources available for higher-order reasoning processes that are presumably required for cue interaction (see De Houwer & Beckers, 2003 , for further discussion concerning the role of mental resources for cue interaction). By dividing the experiment into two different blocks, the number of cues included in each block was (somewhat) decreased. The two blocks were separated by presentation of verbal instructions telling participants that cues, outcomes, and cue-outcome relationships in the first block had nothing to do with those in second; moreover, all food cues used in one block differed from those in the other.
With this procedure, information from the first block carried over to the second block was expected to be small.
Method
Participants. The participants were 15 (7 male and 8 female) undergraduate students from the Health Sciences University of Hokkaido. In this and the following experiments, ages of participants were not recorded. They participated as volunteers. The instructions and verbal labels were presented in Japanese on a computer monitor. Below, we provide their translations into English.
Apparatus and stimuli. Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor in individual cubicles. The presentation of stimuli and instructions, as well as registration of the responses was controlled with SuperLab 4.0. Participants entered their Yes/No responses and their ratings by means of a keyboard. The roles of the keys to be used was specified with stickers on each engaged key.
Two sets of seven food pictures with verbal labels immediately below each picture were used as cues in the experiment (see Table  1 for a summary of the design). The first set of foods included apple (serving as Cue X or Y), banana (Cue Y or X), fish (Cue A), potato (Cue B or C), cucumber (Cue C or B), garlic (Cue L), and bacon (Cue M). The second set of foods included peach (Cue X or Y), strawberry (Cue Y or X), crab (Cue A), mushroom (Cue B or C), nuts (Cue C or B), egg (Cue L), and cheese (Cue M). The stimuli used as Cues X and Y and those used as Cues B and C in each set were alternated across participants for counterbalancing purposes. In this and following experiments, counterbalancing was done using an incomplete Latin square and was done as best as possible given the number of subjects used. The first set of cues was always used in the first block of the experiment and the second set in the second block, with superlearning and overshadowing counterbalanced between the first and the second blocks. Four different outcomes, strong, moderate, weak, and no allergic reactions, were used. Each outcome consisted of a written message about the intensity of allergic reactions ("A very strong allergic reaction occurred!", "An allergic reaction occurred.", "A weak allergic reaction occurred.", and "No allergic reaction occurred.", respectively), an illustration of the status of the patient, and a 
, C 2 , L 2 , M 2 , X 2 , and Y 2 , were food cues, and "ϩ", "ϩϩ", and "ϩϩϩ" represent weak, moderate, and intense allergic reactions, respectively. "Ϫ" represents no allergic reaction on that trial. The order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Actual foods used in each block were counterbalanced across participants as were the foods designated as Cues B and C, and as Cues X and Y (and A in Experiment 4) within each block. Leading numbers refer to the numbers of each trial type.
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vertical bar graph, the height of which corresponded to the severity of the allergic reaction (100, 50, 20, and 0 of the vertical scale, respectively). There were no numeric scaling labels on the vertical bar graph. Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, printed instructions were presented on the screen. The instructions explained to the participants that they would play the role of an allergist who is trying to identify allergy-causing and -preventing foods for two patients in a hypothetical situation. For this purpose, they were going to check daily records about what kind of food(s) the patients ate and whether and how strong an allergic reaction occurred. When checking records, food(s) eaten on a given day was first presented on the screen and then the participants were asked to guess whether an allergic reaction occurred on that day by pressing either "Yes" or "No" key on the keyboard. After pressing the key, the screen would inform the participant what had occurred to the patient on that day. All of the records of one patient were presented first and then they were going to be asked to estimate the potential of each food to cause/prevent allergic reaction one by one for that patient. Next, records of the second patient were presented, followed by rating of the allergy-causing or preventing potential of each food. The foods eaten by the two patients were completely different.
The experiment consisted of two blocks: superlearning and overshadowing. As indicated in Table 1 , one of the blocks included superlearning training trials in which the target cue X 1 was reinforced in compound with a conditioned preventer B 1 , and the other block (overshadowing block) included overshadowing training trials in which the target cue X 2 was reinforced in compound with a neutral (potentially overshadowing) cue C 2 . The order of the two blocks was counterbalanced among participants. When presented alone, each stimulus was always centered on screen. When presented in compound, the stimuli were centered vertically and shifted to either the left or the right horizontally so the compound was centered. The left-right position of each stimulus in compound trials was determined according to the alphabetical label representing the role of each cue in the experimental design. When two cues were presented, the cue assigned the earlier alphabetical label was always located on the left side of the screen. Each block consisted of three phases: a pretraining (Pre) phase, Phase 1, and Phase 2, with the events occurring in each phase indicated in Table 1 . The pretraining phase was further divided into three cycles and Phases 1 and 2 into six cycles. Each cycle included the same number and variety of trials. The order of the trials within each cycle was randomized for each participant. Immediately after the absence or graded presence of an allergic reaction was presented on a given trial, the food(s) eaten by the patient on the next day was presented.
When the participant finished all 60 training trials included in the first block, printed instructions on the screen asked participants to rate the potential of each food item to cause/prevent an allergic reaction on a Likert scale of Ϫ5 to 5. Each of the seven cues used in the first block was presented on the screen sequentially. A horizontal rating scale was presented with integer labels from Ϫ5 to 5, with the label "strongly prevents allergic reaction" above the scale mark of Ϫ5, "no effect" above 0, and "strongly causes allergic reaction" above 5. Below the rating scale was the message "With the keyboard, please indicate the likelihood of this food causing an allergic reaction from Ϫ5 to 5." Among the cues, Cues X and Y were first presented, then Cues A, B, and C, and finally Cues L and M. The orders of the cues within these three sets were randomized for each participant. After the participants had rated all seven cues, the second block of the experiment started with the instructions that records of the second patient, who was different from the first person, were going to be presented. The participants were asked to check the records and then rate the allergy causing and preventing properties of the food items in the same manner as for the first patient. The second block of the experiment was conducted in the same manner as the first except for the change in stimulus set and treatment during Phase 2 described above.
Results and Discussion
Mean ratings of each cue for the two patients are depicted in Figure 1 . Of focal interest are ratings of Cues X and Y in both blocks. As can be seen, ratings of Cue X were considerably higher than those to Cue Y in the superlearning block, consistent with the occurrence of a superlearning effect. In contrast, ratings of X and Y did not differ appreciably from each other in the overshadowing block. A 2 (Block: Superlearning vs. Overshadowing) ϫ 2 (Stimuli: Cue X vs. Cue Y) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) detected a main effect of stimuli, F(1, 14) ϭ 26.39, MSE ϭ .77, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .65, and block, F(1, 14) ϭ 14.04, MSE ϭ 1.29, p ϭ .002, p 2 ϭ .50. More important, it revealed an interaction, F(1, 14) ϭ 9.65, MSE ϭ 1.66, p ϭ .008, p 2 ϭ .41. Newman-Keuls tests revealed that there were differences between ratings of Cues X and Y in the Superlearning block and between ratings of Cue X across the two blocks, p ϭ .001 and p Ͻ .001, respectively. Ratings of Cues X and Y in the Overshadowing block did not differ significantly from each other, p ϭ .96.
To verify the effectiveness of conditioned preventive training, we compared ratings of Cue B 2 in the overshadowing block with Figure 1 . Results of Experiment 1. Mean rating of each cue in the test phase. The experiment was divided into two blocks, superlearning (SL) and overshadowing (OV), each of which consisted of training phases and a testing phase. Participants rated the potential of each food cue to cause an allergic reaction from Ϫ5 (strongly prevents allergic reaction), 0 (no effect), to 5 (strongly causes allergic reaction) according to the information they obtained during the training phases. Error bars represent SEs of scores normalized according to Cousineau and O'Brien (2014) . See Table 1 for the design. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
those of Cue C 1 in the superlearning block. This was done because Cues B and C in the opposing blocks were both paired with allergic reactions in Phase 2 which precluded a direct test of the effectiveness of inhibitory training of Cue B in the superlearning condition. Participants responded with an appreciable negative value for Cue B 2 , the putative preventive cue, whereas they did not rate Cue C 1 , a putatively neutral cue, as a preventive cause. A within-subjects t test revealed that ratings of Cue B 2 were lower than those of Cue C 1 , t(14) ϭ 14.00, p Ͻ .001. The highly negative ratings of Cue B 2 relative to Cue C 1 indicate that the featurenegative training used in Experiment 1 was effective in establishing B 2 as a preventative cause.
In Experiment 1, we demonstrated a genuine superlearning effect in human causal judgment, as predicted by many associative theories (e.g., Denniston et al., 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981) . Notably, this conclusion is identical to that of prior experiments (e.g., Aitken et al., 2000) , but here we have demonstrated causal superlearning simultaneously with elemental and overshadowing controls that were heretofore lacking.
Here we consider the diverse theoretical accounts of superlearning as an understanding of divergent accounts is necessary to appreciate the rationales for Experiments 2-4, which probed potential mechanisms underlying superlearning. Superlearning is problematic for probabilistic theories which explain phenomena in causal learning according to a simple conditional probability between a potential cause and the effect (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Rescorla, 1968) . In the framework of these models, responding to the superlearning cue should be equal that to the overshadowing and elemental acquisition cues because the probabilities of the effect in the presence and the absence of these three cues did not differ.
Associative models that can explain superlearning often do so with different underlying mechanisms. The Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) model explains superlearning as the consequence of different strengths of association established during the training phase. Specifically, when a cue and an outcome are paired, the associative strength between the two changes according to two factors: the associabilities of the cue and outcome and the surprisingness of the outcome on that trial. The latter is determined by the discrepancy between the asymptotic associative strength the outcome can support and total associative strength of all the cues present on that trial. By presenting a cue which has a negative associative strength with the outcome (i.e., a conditioned inhibitor) during target cue-outcome trials, the total associative strength of the cues on that trial decreases and consequently the surprisingness of the outcome increases. As a result, the increase in associative strength between the target cue and the outcome on that trial is greater compared with when the target cue alone is paired with the outcome. The SOP model (e.g., Mazur & Wagner, 1982; Wagner, 1981) provides an explanation of superlearning based on a mechanism similar to that of the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) 
A distinctly different type of explanation is provided by another associative theory, the extended comparator hypothesis (Denniston et al., 2001 ) and its mathematical implementation, SOCR (Stout & Miller, 2007) . In the framework of this model, when multiple cues and an outcome are paired at the time of training, associations are formed between the cues as well as between each cue and an outcome, and critically, responding to a cue at test is determined by the interaction of multiple associations that were formed during training. Specifically, responding to a target cue is assumed to reflect a comparison of the outcome representation directly activated by the target (test) cue and that indirectly activated by the target cue through target cue to companion cue(s) to outcome associative linkages. The stronger the directly activated outcome representation is, the greater excitatory responding should be, and the stronger the indirectly activated outcome representation is, the weaker the excitatory responding (and stronger behavior indicative of so-called conditioned inhibition). The directly activated representation of the outcome is determined by the strength of the association between the target cue and the outcome (called Link 1), and the indirect activation of the outcome is determined by the product of two associations, an association between the target cue and the other cue(s) designated a comparator cue (called Link 2) and that between the comparator cue and the outcome (called Link 3). The effects of Links 2 and 3 are also modulated by analogous comparator processes between first-order comparator stimuli and higher-order comparator stimuli.
The extended comparator hypothesis (Denniston et al., 2001 ) explains superlearning as follows: When a target cue is paired with an outcome in compound with a previously established conditioned preventer, an association between the target cue and the outcome and another association between the target cue and the conditioned preventer are formed. Here, the conditioned preventer acts like a conditioned inhibitor because the representation of the outcome directly activated by it is weaker than the representation of the outcome indirectly activated by its own excitatory companion cue. Thus, when the target cue of the superlearning is presented at test, indirect activation of the outcome should be of effectively negative value and consequently should enhance responding to the target cue. Alternatively stated, the extended comparator hypothesis explains the superlearning phenomenon as superresponding at the time of testing rather than superassociative acquisition at the time of training (see Urushihara et al., 2005 , for further elaboration).
The propositional reasoning account of learning phenomena (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond, 2003; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009 ) also seems to be able to explain superlearning, albeit at a very different level of analysis than the associative accounts. The propositional account has been put forward to explain various learning phenomena including some cue interaction effects (e.g., blocking; Beckers, De Houwer, Pineño, & Miller, 2005; Peter, Been, Mitchell, Bouton, & Frohardt, 2003) . In this framework, learning phenomena are assumed to be the result of formation and evaluation of propositions. This formation and evaluation of the proposition is presumably based on conscious, effortful, controlled reasoning processes that are hypothesized to consume considerable time and mental resources (at least compared to the automatic association formation processes generally hypothesized by associative theories). In its framework, the superlearning effect is explained as the result of formation and expression of propositions as follows: (a) Presentation of Cue A (the training excitor of the preventive cue) with the allergic reaction establishes the proposition that A causes a strong allergic reaction. (b) Presentation of Cue A in compound with Cue B (the preventive cue) is not accompanied by any allergic reaction; this establishes the proposition that Cue B prevents allergic reactions of other cues. (c) Presentation of Cue X (the superlearning cue) in compound with Cue B is paired with a weak allergic reaction despite the preventive power of Cue B. Thus, the participants reason that Cue X is a stronger cause of the allergic reaction This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
than is Y, despite its being paired by itself with an allergic reaction of the same magnitude as Cue X. There exist at least two fundamental differences between the explanations for superlearning offered by the associative models and that of the propositional account. First, the associative models posit that causal superlearning results from the formation and expression of associations between causes and effects achieved through relatively simple algorithms, whereas the propositional account regards it as the result of higher-order reasoning processes including the formation and evaluation of the propositions. Second, the associative models provide more quantitative predictions than the propositional approach at least as it is currently formulated. The following experiments were designed to probe some of these differences between the associative and propositional approaches to cue interactions.
Experiment 2
As previously mentioned, our pilot studies, which were replications of prior research on causal superlearning (i.e., Aitken et al., 2000) with the necessary control conditions added, failed. In these studies, the ratings of the superlearning cue did not exceed those of the elemental acquisition control. Thus, the procedure in Experiment 1 was changed considerably from that used by Aitken et al. Presumably, at least one of the features changed between their and our studies was critical for our obtaining genuine superlearning relative to the elemental acquisition condition. Decreasing the number of cues participants had to remember at one time by dividing the experiment into two blocks was potentially important because this was the change that was made immediately before our first successful demonstration of superlearning (i.e., Experiment 1). In our Experiment 1, the number of cues participants had to remember in each block was seven, whereas in Aitken et al., participants had to remember 22 (in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2) to 28 (in Experiment 3) cues. A previous study by Vandorpe and De Houwer (2006) showed that some types of cue competition are elusive when the number of cues included in the experiment is large, an observation that they interpreted as supportive of the propositional account because more cues presumably demand more mental effort, thereby leaving insufficient resources for the reasoning assumed to be necessary to produce cue interactions. In sharp contrast, none of the associative accounts of superlearning lead to this prediction. In Experiment 2, we focused on the consequences for causal superlearning of increasing the number of cues that had to be remembered at one time.
In Experiment 2, we used a total of 14 food cues, which were divided into two sets of 7 cues. Cues in each set were assigned to roles of the cues in two superlearning blocks. Participants were assigned to one of two groups, which differed in how the training and testing of the two sets of cues were conducted. In Group Separate, training and testing of each set of seven cues was conducted separately in two independent blocks (as in Experiment 1), and in Group Mixed, training and testing of the two sets of seven cues were merged into a single block (see Table 2 ). As a result, in Group Mixed, the number of cues 
Note. A 1 , B 1 , C 1 , L 1 , M 1 , X 1 , Y 1 , A 2 , B 2 , C 2 , L 2 , M 2 , X 2 , and Y 2 , were food cues, and "ϩ", "ϩϩ", and "ϩϩϩ" represent weak, moderate, and intense allergic reactions, respectively. "Ϫ" represents no allergic reaction on that trial. In Group Separate, two training-testing blocks composed with seven food cues were conducted sequentially, with verbal instructions between the two blocks. In Group Mixed, one training-testing block with 14 food cues was conducted. The sets of actual food stimuli used in two blocks of Group Separate were counterbalanced across participants as were foods used as Cues X and Y within each block. Leading numbers refer to the numbers of each trial type. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
participants had to process at one time was twice that of Group Separate. In this and Experiment 3, a comparison between superlearning and overshadowing cues was omitted. This was done because in human contingency learning, when a cue is trained in compound with another neutral cue, in most cases ratings of the cue decrease (i.e., overshadowing) rather than increase (i.e., potentiation). Thus, there is little reason to anticipate ratings of Cue X in an overshadowing block will exceed those in elemental acquisition control. Supportive of this view, some of our pilot studies showed that ratings of a superlearning cue exceeded those in an overshadowing control condition but not those in an elemental acquisition control condition. Thus, in light of the existing literature and the results of Experiment 1, so long as ratings of the superlearning cue are superior to those of the elemental acquisition control cue, we view it as reasonable to conclude that superlearning has occurred.
Method
Participants. The participants were 21 (3 male and 18 female) undergraduate students at the Health Sciences University of Hokkaido. Eleven participants were randomly assigned to Group Separate and 10 to Group Mixed.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The apparatus and stimuli used as cues and outcomes were identical to those used in Experiment 1. For Group Separate, the procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1 except for the following changes. First, both blocks of Experiment 2 were equivalent to the superlearning block in Experiment 1. Second, the sets of food stimuli used in the first and the second blocks were counterbalanced across participants. Third, the food stimuli used as Cues B and C were not counterbalanced because in Experiment 2 Cue C was never a companion to target cue X. The instructions, manner of presentation and randomization of the training trials, and manner of testing were all identical to those in Experiment 1.
For Group Mixed, like Group Separate, two sets of seven cues were used, and cues in each set played the roles of cues in the superlearning block of Experiment 1. In contrast, for Group Mixed, the two sets were presented fully interspersed in one large block rather than separately in two blocks. Specifically, the experiment for Group Mixed consisted of three training phases, Phase Pre, Phase 1, and Phase 2, each of which included twice as many trial numbers and types of food as those in Group Separate. The pretraining phase was further divided into three cycles and Phases 1 and 2 into six cycles. Each cycle included each type of trial equally often, and the order of the trials was randomized within each cycle.
Because of the change in the number of blocks, the instructions used for Group Mixed were slightly modified from those used in Experiment 1 and for Group Separate so that participants were informed there would be only one patient to evaluate. The testing procedure for Group Mixed was identical to that in Experiment 1 and to Group Separate except for the number of cues tested; a total of 14 cues were tested in a single test phase. The two X and two Y cues were tested first, followed by the two A cues, the two B cues, and the two C cues, and finally the two L cues and two M cues, with the order within each grouping randomized for each participant.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 2 was unique in this series in using a betweensubjects design for the critical manipulations. This made it necessary to assess whether block order in Group Separate interacted with the other variables. Consequently, potential differences among the cues in the first and the second blocks of Group Separate were investigated with a 2 (blocks) ϫ 7 (cues) repeated measures ANOVA. The ANOVA yielded a main effect of cues, F(6, 60) ϭ 68.04, MSE ϭ 2.56, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .87, whereas neither the main effect of blocks nor the interaction was significant, F(1, 10) ϭ 0.04, p ϭ .853, MSE ϭ 0.73, p 2 ϭ .00, and F(6, 60) ϭ 1.53, p ϭ .185, MSE ϭ 0.63, p 2 ϭ .13, respectively. As there was no significant difference in the ratings of each cue between the first and the second blocks in Group Separate and no interaction with cues, ratings of cues playing the same role in each block were pooled within each group in the following analyses.
Mean ratings of each type of cue in the two groups are depicted in Figure 2 . Our main interest was in the ratings of the superlearning cues (X) and its control cues (Y In addition, ratings of Cue X in Group Separate were higher than that in Group Mixed, p ϭ .019, whereas there was no difference between groups in ratings of Cue Y, p ϭ .412. Finally, differences between groups in ratings of each of the remaining cues were separately analyzed with independent t tests, which revealed no significant difference in ratings of any of these cues, the smallest p ϭ .191. Figure 2 . Results of Experiment 2. Mean rating of each cue in the test phase for Groups Separate and Mixed. In both groups, 14 food cues were used to compose two superlearning blocks with 7 cues each. For Group Separate, the experiment was divided into two blocks of 7 cues each, whereas in Group Mixed, the experiment was consisted of one large block with 14 cues. Each block consisted of training phases and a testing phase. Participants rated the potential of each food cue to cause an allergic reaction from Ϫ5 (strongly prevents allergic reaction), 0 (no effect), to 5 (strongly causes allergic reaction) according to the information they obtained during training phases. Error bars represent the SEs of the mean. See Table 2 for the design. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
In Experiment 2, the superlearning effect was successfully replicated in Group Separate but not in Group Mixed. An interesting finding was that ratings of cues other than X were not affected by the difference in number of cues. Thus, the data preclude an account based on there being a difference in the status of the companion cue of Cue X (i.e., Cue B) because there was no appreciable difference in ratings of B.
Several associative learning theories that can account for the results of Experiment 1 have difficulty in explaining the results of Experiment 2. As the number of each trial type was identical in the two groups, possible explanations by the associative theories are mainly based on the hypothetical difference in the associative status of the background stimuli (i.e., the context). Presumably differences in total number of trials or outcome presentations should have resulted in different associative strengths between the training context and the outcome. In the framework of acquisitionfocused models (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981) , lower ratings of the superlearning cue in Group Mixed compared to Group Separate reflects impaired acquisition of the targetoutcome association during training directly or indirectly caused by the training context. The extended comparator hypothesis (Denniston et al., 2001) attributes the difference in the superlearning effect between the two groups to the difference in the associative status of the context at the time of testing. The problem with such explanations is obvious; there is no reason why the context should have affected only the ratings of the superlearning cue. Even if the status of the context differed between the two groups, ratings of all the cues, especially those of the elemental control cue (Cue Y), should also have been affected. This prediction is contrary to the results of Experiment 2. Notably, although the explanation of the results of Experiment 2 by the comparator hypothesis and that by the acquisition-focused theories are similar, these two explanations differ from each other in one major way. The acquisition-focused theories posit that it is the status of the training context at the time of training that has an effect on ratings of the target cue at test, whereas the comparator hypothesis posits that it is the status of the training context at test that has an effect on ratings of the target cue. This difference concerning the putative role of the training context was addressed in Experiment 3.
In contrast to associative theories (Denniston et al., 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981) , the propositional account of superlearning (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; De Houwer et al., 2005; Lovibond, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2009 ) can explain the results in Experiment 2. In the propositional framework, superlearning of Cue X is a result of a sequence of three propositions as described previously. In contrast, learning about other cues such as the conditioned preventer (B) or elementally trained cue (Y) only required at most the first two of these propositions. Presumably a decision based on three propositions (i.e., superlearning) requires more mental resources than a decision based on one or two propositions. In Group Mixed, processing as many as 14 cues in one block presumably required considerable mental resources. However, there may have been sufficient resources left to process simple associative learning between cues and outcomes (e.g., Cue Y) or relatively simple cue interactions such as conditioned prevention (Cue B), but not enough to process the more complex cue interaction that presumably underlies superlearning (Cue X). Thus, the propositional account is able to explain the observation that ratings of the superlearning cue were selectively affected by the number of cues used in a given block.
In Experiment 2, we manipulated the number of cues that participants had to process at one time by dividing the experiment into one or two blocks. This manipulation was inevitably accompanied by a change in the length of each block and the number of outcome presentations in each block. However, as there was no difference between groups in ratings of cues other than the superlearning cue, it is implausible that the differences in these basic parameters affected the ratings of Cue X. The following experiment further assessed the possible role of these variables, other than cognitive load, by using a within-subject rather than betweensubjects design.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, the effect of the total number of cues being processed during superlearning treatment was further investigated with a modification of the procedure used for Group Separate in Experiment 2. As in Group Separate of Experiment 2, two sets of seven cues, both of which included a superlearning contingency, were used. The procedure of Experiment 3 differed from that of Group Separate in Experiment 2 in that training with each set of cues was completed, one set of cues at a time, before any testing was conducted (see Table 3 ). However, critically, the set of cues trained second (Condition Immediate) was tested first. Consequently, training and testing of the set of cues in Condition Immediate came between training and testing of the first set of cues (Condition Interrupted). More important, unlike the procedure used for Group Separate in Experiment 2, the two training blocks with different sets of cues were conducted sequentially without being divided by instructions concerning a change of hypothetical patients; that is, all events presumably applied to a single patient. Consequently, as in Group Mixed in Experiment 2, participants had to keep track of all 14 cues until testing.
The procedure of Experiment 3 allowed us to differentiate between predictions from the different theoretical viewpoints. In Experiment 3, training of cues in Condition Interrupted was conducted in a context in which no previous training with the other set of cues had been conducted (as was the case in Experiment 1), whereas training of cues in Condition Immediate was conducted in a context in which training with cues of the other set had just been conducted. According to the Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972 ) model, it is the difference in associative status of the training context at the time of training that could have a differential effects on superlearning across conditions. Thus, superlearning in Condition Immediate should be affected by the prior presentation of cues in Condition Interrupted, whereas superlearning in Condition Interrupted should not be so influenced. In contrast, in the framework of the comparator hypothesis (Denniston et al., 2001) , it is the difference in associative status of the training context at test that could have an influence on the superlearning effect. Thus, the superlearning effect in the two conditions of Experiment 3 should not differ from each other; the results of two conditions are expected to be similar to that of Group Mixed in Experiment 2.
It is more difficult to make a clear prediction based on the propositional framework (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2005) . During training of Condition Interrupted, only seven cues will have been introduced, whereas during training of Condition Immediate, a This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
total of 14 cues will have been presented that is expected to make it more difficult to form complex propositions. Thus, when we focus on the process of proposition formation, the propositional framework predicts that superlearning is more likely to be observed in Condition Interrupted than in Condition Immediate, which is similar to the prediction by the acquisition-focused models. However, as there were no instructions given concerning either the order of training blocks or testing, participants in Experiment 3 had to process 14 cues until the end of testing in both conditions. Thus, the participants would encounter considerable difficulty preserving and processing all the information at the time of testing, as in Group Mixed in Experiment 2. Thus, when we focus on the process of proposition evaluation, a reduced superlearning effect is expected in both conditions that is similar to the prediction by the comparator hypothesis. In summary, the acquisition-focused models anticipated superlearning only in Condition Interrupted, and the comparator hypothesis anticipated little superlearning in either condition. The propositional account is more ambiguous as its predictions depend on whether the manipulation of the present experiment has an effect mainly on the proposition-formation or the proposition-evaluation process.
Method
Participants. The participants were 24 (6 male and 18 female) undergraduate students at the Health Sciences University of Hokkaido.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The apparatus, stimuli used as cues and outcomes, assignment and counterbalancing of food stimuli, and procedure including instructions were all identical to those used in Group Mixed in Experiment 2 except for the changes noted below. In Experiment 3, two sets of seven cues were assigned, one to Condition Immediate and the other to Condition Interrupted. Training of Condition Interrupted was conducted first, followed by training of Condition Immediate. Specifically, Phase Pre, Phase 1, and Phase 2 of Condition Interrupted were conducted, followed by Phase Pre, Phase 1, and Phase 2 of Condition Immediate. Then testing of the Condition Immediate cues was conducted, followed by those of Condition Interrupted. No instruction or event was interposed between training of two conditions or between testing of the two conditions. Consequently, participants had no basis for knowing when the change between conditions occurred during training or testing. Trial order within each phase and testing was randomized in the same manner as in Experiment 1 and in Group Separate in Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
Mean ratings of each cue in the two conditions are depicted in Figure 3 . In Condition Immediate, superlearning was observed; that is, Cue X was rated higher than Cue Y, whereas there was no 
, C 2 , L 2 , M 2 , X 2 , and Y 2 , were food cues, and "ϩ", "ϩϩ", and "ϩϩϩ" represent weak, moderate, and intense allergic reactions, respectively. "Ϫ" represents no allergic reaction on that trial. Training trials of Condition Interrupted was followed by that of Condition Immediate, and testing of cues in Conditioned Immediate was followed by that in Condition Interrupted. There was no verbal instruction or events between two training blocks or between two testing blocks so that there was no knowing for participants that the training or testing conditions had changed. Actual foods used in each condition were counterbalanced across participants as were foods designated as Cues X and Y within each block. Leading numbers refer to the numbers of each trial type. Figure 3 . Results of Experiment 3. Mean rating to each cue in the test phase in Conditions Interrupted and Immediate. The experiment was designed with two sets of 7 food cues, each of which consisted of training phases and a testing phase and was composed of identical superlearning blocks. Training phases of Condition Interrupted cues were conducted first and those of Condition Immediate followed. Then testing of Condition Immediate cues was conducted followed by testing of Condition Interrupted cues. Participants rated the potential of each food cue to cause an allergic reaction from Ϫ5 (strongly prevents allergic reaction), 0 (no effect), to 5 (strongly causes allergic reaction) according to the information they obtained during training phases. Error bars represent SEs of scores normalized according to Cousineau and O'Brien (2014) . See Table 3 for the design. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
such tendency in Condition Interrupted. A 2 (Stimuli: Cue X vs. Cue Y) ϫ 2 (Condition: Immediate vs. Interrupted) repeated measures ANOVA detected an interaction, F(1, 23) ϭ 7.75, MSE ϭ .65, p ϭ .011, p 2 ϭ .25. Neither the main effect of stimuli nor condition was significant, Fs(1, 23) ϭ 3.12 and 2.14, MSE ϭ 2.26 and 0.96, ps ϭ .091 and .157, p 2 ϭ .12 and .09, respectively. Newman-Keuls tests revealed that there were significant differences between Cues X and Y in Condition Immediate and between Cue X across the two conditions, p ϭ .002 and .004, respectively. Analysis of the ratings of the other cues found that ratings of none of these cues differed significantly between two conditions, all ts(23) Ͻ 1.68, the smallest p ϭ .108.
Although the number of cues participants processed within each condition was identical, superlearning was observable only when the training and testing of cues were conducted in temporal proximity (i.e., in Condition Immediate). These results indicate that explanations of the results of Experiment 2 in terms of differences in experimental procedures are implausible. In addition, the results of Experiment 3 are inconsistent with the previously described explanations of the results of Experiment 2 based on the RescorlaWagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) or the comparator hypothesis (Denniston et al., 2001 ). As we discussed in the introduction, the acquisition-focused associative theories predict that superlearning should have been stronger in Condition Interrupted than Condition Immediate, which is opposite to what was observed. The comparator hypothesis cannot explain the different levels of superlearning observed in Experiment 3 because the associative status of the context at test should have been identical in the two conditions because of the experiment's within-subject design.
Like the associative theories, the propositional reasoning account is challenged by the findings of Experiment 3. As the training block of Condition Interrupted was conducted before that of Condition Immediate, participants processed a larger number of cues at the time of training in Condition Immediate than in Condition Interrupted. This should have required more mental resources at the time of proposition formation in Condition Immediate, which consequently should have impaired superlearning in that condition. However, because of testing being delayed until both training conditions had been presented, participants had to process all 14 cues at the time of testing in Experiment 3. This should have required considerable mental resources at the time of proposition evaluation (i.e., testing) and consequently resulted in an impaired superlearning effect in both conditions of Experiment 3. Thus, the propositional account is unable to explain why superlearning was observable in Condition Immediate of Experiment 3, but not in Group Mixed of Experiment 2 or Condition Interrupted of Experiment 3; however, the former comparison must be viewed cautiously as it is between experiments. In summary, both the associative theories and the propositional account are challenged by the results of Experiment 3.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was designed to assess the validity of the propositional account of superlearning by testing a seemingly a priori prediction of the model. The propositional account fit the findings of Experiment 2 as well as the basic superlearning effect found in Experiment 1. However, the specific predictions concerning the superlearning effect might be viewed as post hoc because other propositional reasoning assumptions that do not fit the results of the previous experiments seem equally plausible. For example, the following propositional reasoning can plausibly be applied to Experiment 1. (a) Presentation of Cue A with the allergic reaction establishes the proposition that Cue A causes a strong allergic reaction. (b) Presentation of Cue A in combination with Cue B causes no allergic reaction; this establishes the proposition that Cue B prevents allergic reaction by any causal cue. (c) Cue X in combination with Cue B causes a stronger allergic reaction than Cue A in combination with Cue B; thus, Cue X has a greater potential to cause an allergic reaction than does Cue A. Note that proposition 3 here differs from proposition 3 that was described in the Discussion of Experiment 1, though they both follow from the same type of "reasoning" applied to the present superlearning procedure. This alternative set of propositions leads to the inference that ratings of Cue X should have been higher than those of Cue A as well as Cue Y.
Unlike the propositional reasoning account, the associative learning models predict that in superlearning, ratings of Cue X will not be stronger than ratings of Cue A because Cue A was paired with an outcome more frequently than Cue X and its outcome was more intense. Although the mechanisms hypothesized by the associative models to explain the superlearning are distinctly different from each other, they are in agreement that responding to Cue X is determined by two factors. One factor is the conventional parameters of cue-outcome associative learning, such as the associabilities of the stimuli, the magnitude of the outcome directly paired with the target cue, and the number of pairings of the two associates. The other factor is the influences of companion cues present during the target cue-outcome pairings (e.g., cue interaction effects such as cue competition). In our previous experiments, the conditioning parameters for Cues X and Y were equated to allow us to assess the consequences of a companion cue that was previously established as a conditioned preventer. However, the conditioning parameters for Cues A and X differed greatly; Cue X was paired with the weak outcome on a relatively small number of trials, whereas Cue A was paired with the strong outcome on a relatively large number of trials. Thus, based on the associative accounts, there was little reason to expect ratings of Cue X in the present superlearning situation to be more robust than that to Cue A.
In fact, visual comparisons of the data indicate that ratings of Cue X were consistently weaker than ratings of Cue A in Experiments 1-3, which is opposite to the prediction of the proposition account but is anticipated by the associative learning models considered above. The same tendency as in our Experiments 1-3 was observed in Aitken et al. (2000) , whereas in Turner et al. (2004) , ratings of the training excitor used in preventive conditioning were lower than those of the superlearning cue, which is contrary to our Experiments 1-3 and Aitken et al. However, in our previous experiments and Turner et al., the stimuli used as Cue A was not counterbalanced with that used as Cue X, so that comparisons of ratings between Cues A and X were confounded by physical identity of cues. In addition, neither of the two prior publications included both of the necessary control conditions to confirm the occurrence of genuine superlearning. For these reasons, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions concerning relative ratings of X and A from the two prior papers or our Experiments This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
1-3. Thus, in Experiment 4, we replicated Experiment 1 with Cues A, X, and Y all counterbalanced to permit unbiased comparisons of the ratings of these three cues. Note that such counterbalancing was not introduced in the previous experiments because doing so was assumed to be unnecessary from the standpoint of associative learning models and traditional experimental designs for classical conditioning. As various conditions such as the number of cueoutcome pairings and magnitude of the outcome used during training trials differed greatly between Cue A and Cues X and Y, comparison among these three cues would have been uninformative without a testable prediction such as that drawn from the propositional account.
Method
Participants. The participants were 33 (7 male and 26 female) undergraduate students at the Health Sciences University of Hokkaido.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The procedure (see Table 1), apparatus, and stimuli used as outcomes were all identical to those of Experiment 1 except as noted. The two sets of seven food stimuli used as cues were slightly changed. In one set of foods in which fish had played the role of Cue A, fish was replaced by orange, and apple, banana, and orange served as Cues A, X, and Y, with the functional role of each counterbalanced across participants. In the other set, crab was replaced by grapes, and peach, strawberry, and grapes served as Cues A, X, and Y with their roles counterbalanced. This was done to reduce irrelevant differences across A, X, and Y. The assignment and counterbalancing of other cues in each set was the same as in Experiment 1. The first set of cues was always used in the first block of the experiment and the second set in the second block, whereas whether X was subject to superlearning or overshadowing treatment first was counterbalanced. In the testing phase of each block, Cues A, X, and Y were tested first, then Cues B and C, and finally Cues L and M. The orders of the cues within these three sets were randomized.
Results and Discussion
Mean ratings of each cue for the two hypothetical patients are depicted in Figure 4 . As in Experiment 1, ratings of Cue X were higher than those of Cue Y in the superlearning block, whereas there was little difference between these two cues in the overshadowing block, suggesting a successful replication of the basic superlearning effect despite an absence of statistically significant overshadowing. Our main concern here was ratings of Cue A, which turned out to be higher than those of Cue X in the superlearning block. These tendencies were confirmed by the following statistical analyses.
A 2 (Block: Superlearning vs. Overshadowing) ϫ 3 (Stimuli: Cue A vs. Cue X vs. Cue Y) repeated measures ANOVA detected a main effect of stimuli, F(2, 64) ϭ 70.68, MSE ϭ 2.03, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .69, and an interaction, F(2, 64) ϭ 17.04, MSE ϭ 1.34, p Ͻ .001, 2 ϭ .35. Newman-Keuls tests revealed that there were differences between ratings of Cues X and Y in the superlearning block and between ratings of Cue X across the two blocks, both ps Ͻ .001. Most important for assessment of the propositional account, there was a difference between ratings of Cues A and X in the superlearning block, p ϭ .006. As in Experiment 1, to confirm that Cue B had become a preventative cause, we conducted a within-subjects t test between ratings of Cue B in overshadowing block and those of Cue C in the superlearning block, which revealed a difference, t(32) ϭ 13.45, p Ͻ .001, r 2 ϭ .85. In addition to replicating superlearning in a human causal learning situation, Experiment 4 found ratings of Cue X, a superlearning cue, to be lower than those of Cue A, the training excitor for preventive cue training, even though a superlearning effect was clearly obtained with Cue X in comparison with Cue Y. As noted in the introduction, this is fully anticipated by the previously discussed associative models. In contrast, that the ratings of Cue X were lower than those of Cue A in the superlearning block is problematic for the propositional account. We can think of no form of propositional reasoning that leads to an expectation that Cue A is a more effective cause than X in producing an allergic reaction. Thus, the inability of the propositional account to predict this observation appears to challenge that account of cue interaction.
General Discussion
The various associative models that can account for superlearning differ from each other in their hypothesized mechanisms. Some of these theories (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981) explain the superlearning effect as acquisition of a stronger superlearning cue-outcome association at the time of training, while others (Denniston et al., 2001; Stout & Miller, 2007) account for the phenomena as a consequence of interactions among multiple associations between cues and the outcome and between the various cues at the time of testing. Both of these approaches are challenged by the results of Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 2, the number of cues included in each block of training was manipulated between groups. As previously discussed, the associative theories predict that difference in total number of training trials or outcome presentations results in a difference in associative status The experiment consisted of two blocks, superlearning (SL) and overshadowing (OV), each included three training phases and a testing phase. Participants provided their ratings of the allergy-causing potential of each food cue from Ϫ5 (strongly prevents allergic reaction), 0 (no effect), to 5 (strongly causes allergic reaction) according to their observations during the training phases. Error bars represent SEs of scores normalized according to Cousineau and O'Brien (2014) . See Table 1 for the design. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of training context, which possibly has an effect on ratings of various cues trained within the context. However, they have difficulty in explaining why the effect of number of cues were observed only in ratings of the superlearning cues. The results of Experiment 3 were also problematic for the associative theories. Acquisition-focused theories claim that associative status of the context at the time of training is critical. Thus, they predict superlearning is relatively easy to obtain provided the target training is conducted before the other set of cues was introduced (i.e., in Interrupted condition). In contrast, the comparator theories assert it is the associative status of the context at the time of testing that has an influence on ratings of the cues. Therefore, they predict that superlearning should be difficult to obtain in both conditions. Neither of these predictions were supported; superlearning was observed only in the Immediate condition. Unlike the acquisition-focused models, the comparator hypothesis assumes that responding to the target cue depends on a comparison of two retrieved outcome representations at the time of testing. Because of this unique feature of the model, it might still be able to account for the results of Experiments 2 and 3 provided one supposes that the effect of the comparator cue is determined not only by the strengths of the target cue-comparator cue withincompound association and comparator cue-outcome association, but also by other factors known to influence memory retrieval. However, one should be cautious about appending additional premises to a formalized model like the comparator hypothesis (e.g., Stout & Miller, 2007) because it often increases complexity, and as a result decreases the model's ability to make unambiguous predictions.
The propositional reasoning account of cue interaction is also successful in explaining some aspects of the present findings. The superlearning effect found in Experiment 1 is explicable in terms of deductive reasoning based on propositions established during training. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2, a decrease in superlearning with increasing numbers of cues, also appears to be explicable in terms of this account because a shortage of the mental resources presumably necessary for higher-order cue interactions might be expected to result from processing a relatively large number of cues during a test trial. However, the results of Experiment 3 are problematic for the propositional account. In that experiment, although participants had to process relatively many cues at one time, superlearning was still observed in the Immediate condition but not in the Interrupted condition. As previously noted, the propositional account predicts that the superlearning effect, if any, should have been observed only in Condition Interrupted, which is contrary to what occurred. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 4, that is, lower ratings of the superlearning cue than those of training excitor, were contrary to an a priori prediction of the propositional account.
One may point out that the results of Experiment 3 are still explicable in the propositional framework if one assumes that the mental resources necessary for processing information about the cues varies with temporal distance between training and testing sessions, and the shortage of mental resource has an effect especially on retrieval of information concerning which cues cooccurred (i.e., within-compound association). Specifically, relatively little mental resource might be required when training and testing trials for a single set of cues are conducted in temporally proximate positions (i.e., Condition Immediate). In contrast, more mental resources might be necessary when training and testing are temporally separated and the interval between training and test are filled with irrelevant cues (i.e., Condition Interrupted) because preserving cue information for a longer duration is presumably more difficult. In this case, the shortage of mental resource might cause poor retrieval of within-compound associations between cues, resulting in a lack of cue interaction, especially higher-order interaction (i.e., superlearning). However, without these additional assumptions, the prediction of the propositional account concerning the relative strength of superlearning in the two conditions of Experiment 3 are opposite to what was actually observed. We also point out that with these additional assumptions, the comparator hypothesis can explain the results of Experiment 3 as well. And as we noted above, adding post hoc assumptions to account for a new data is a dubious enterprise.
There might still be a way for the propositional approach to explain the result of Experiment 4 by supposing that some of participants did not reason perfectly. The ratings of Cue A were close to the maximum value in all of the experiments. This might have made it difficult for any other cues to be rated higher than Cue A. Thus, if one supposes that some participants in Experiment 4 could exhibit superlearning but rated Cue X only as effective as Cue A (because of the ceiling effect), whereas the other participants were not rational enough to exhibit superlearning and they rated Cue X less effective than Cue A, the lower averaged rating of Cue X than that of Cue A would be explicable within the propositional framework. However, at least in current experimental situations, there is no knowing which participants were rational or not. Nor it is certain whether the participants who rated Cue X less effective than Cue A were actually irrational; their responding might have reflected their own propositional reasoning. Thus, we might simply be discarding a part of data which is not favorable for the propositional account and be supporting the propositional account based on remaining data. We cannot deny the possibility that future research might support such an explanation by the propositional account with these additional assumptions, but at this point of time, we have to say such an explanation is post hoc. In Experiment 4, we not only demonstrated the average rating of Cue A was higher than that of Cue X in the superlearning block, but we also demonstrated the average rating of Cue X was higher than that of Cue Y in the same block and Cue X in the overshadowing block. The latter fact clearly shows that the participants were rational enough to show the superlearning effect as a whole, and still, they rated Cue A higher than Cue X as a whole.
We previously noted that the critical result of Experiment 4, the weaker ratings of the superlearning cue compared to the training excitor used during conditioned inhibition training, is anticipated by most associative theories. One merit of these models is that they seemingly provide quantitative as well as qualitative predictions. However, their predictions are often parameter dependent. For example, the Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972 ) model can predict, with different sets of parameters that in practice are never assessed, that ratings of the superlearning cue will be greater than those of the conditioned excitor used in conditioned inhibition training, or weaker than even those of the elemental acquisition cue. Thus, as De Houwer (2009) noted, it might be illusionary to think that the associative models defined by mathematical equations provide more precise predictions than the propositional model. Nevertheless, we still see a distinct advantage of the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
associative models in that their mathematical equations sometimes provide a less ambiguous set of testable predictions than nonquantitative models such as the propositional account. For instance, the Rescorla-Wagner model predicts across a wide range of parameters that ratings of a superlearning cue are apt to be higher than those of the elemental acquisition cue when the feature-negative training trials that establish conditioned inhibition (i.e., Aϩϩϩ/ ABϪ training trials in our experiments) not only precede the BXϩ superlearning trials, but are also interspersed among the superlearning and elemental acquisition control training trials. In contrast, the model predicts that superlearning will be weaker when all the superlearning trials are delayed until all the preventive cue training has been completed. Additionally, the Rescorla-Wagner model predicts that ratings of the training excitor (i.e., Cue A) is more likely to be higher than the superlearning cue (i.e., Cue X) when the outcome paired with Cue A is of greater magnitude than that paired with Cue X. Thus, the mathematical implementation of the associative models has merit in producing numerous specific testable predictions. This is a property notably missing from the propositional account of cue interaction as it has been presented to date.
In conclusion, the present series of experiments provided unequivocal evidence of superlearning in human causal judgment, and also revealed some weaknesses of both associative accounts (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Stout & Miller, 2007; Wagner, 1981) and the propositional account (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; De Houwer et al., 2005; Lovibond, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2009 ) of cue interaction. Associative models have long provided explanations of various cue competition phenomena, mainly observed in classical conditioning of nonhuman animals. More recent research has provided evidence suggesting that some types of cue competition in human associative learning are, at least in part, based on formation and evaluation of propositions (e.g., Beckers et al., 2005; De Houwer, 2002; De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002; Lovibond, 2003; Peter et al., 2003; . One report (Beckers, Miller, De Houwer, & Urushihara, 2006) found that cue competition in classical conditioning of nonhuman animals may also be based at least in part on propositional reasoning. The present research demonstrates how cue facilitation in the form of causal superlearning in humans can add to our understanding of how cues interact when they are trained in compound. Our tentative conclusion is that neither the associative nor propositional approach alone, at least in their present formulations, is sufficient to fully capture the full richness of cue interaction phenomena. To provide more sophisticated predictions and explanations for cue interaction, these two approaches may need to be integrated.
